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Abstract 
During the two decades prior to the global financial crisis, Australian households and investors 
increased their housing credit demand as a consequence of deregulation (along with competition 
between lenders, greater access to credit and new products), a stable economic environment (reflected 
by low inflation and low nominal interest rates, low unemployment, rising incomes and wealth 
accompanied by rising house prices), attractive taxation arrangements, and, arguably, national housing 
policies.  
This scenario changed with the preamble of the global financial turmoil in 2007. Australia was 
`lucky' in avoiding a recession during the global financial crisis, but banks were exposed to liquidity 
risk. As a result, credit growth and house price appreciation have decelerated and the financial sector 
is more concentrated than before the financial turmoil. The trend towards relaxed lending standards 
reversed. Borrowers, both owner occupier and investors are still cautious under the uncertain 
environment.  
This paper gives an overview of these developments in the Australian housing credit market and 
presents relevant responsive policies. A description of current mortgage products available in 
Australia is also offered.   
                                                          
 I would like to thank Mardi Dungey, Graeme Wells, Judy Yates, Chris Stewart and participants at the EMF-
ENHR Joint Seminar, 17-18 September 2013, Brussels, for helpful comments and suggestions. 
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Introduction 
 
During the 1980s, Australia experienced a series of reforms that would transform its economy. From 
the early 1980s to 1996, financial markets were freed from price controls, entry was liberalised, and 
the regulatory structure was renovated. By 1996, the transition from discretionary monetary policy to 
an inflation-targeting regime was complete.    
The first major reform was in December 1983, when the Australian Government decided to float the 
exchange rate and remove most capital controls; since then, the Reserve Bank has only intervened in 
foreign exchange markets to prevent `disorderly’ market behaviour. The second step was the process 
of deregulation and opening capital markets. Interest rates controls on loans were removed in April 
1985.
1
 Another aspect of deregulation was the relaxation of foreign-bank entry restrictions in 1984, 
allowing 15 new overseas banks to license and participate in the Australian financial market over the 
following year.
2
  
By 1988, Australia had the foundations of a modern economic and financial era. This era would 
include freer trade, deregulated markets, lower tax rates, low inflation and a more market-oriented 
economy, see Kelly (2000). Deregulation was expected to deliver more effective monetary policy and 
increased access to credit and financial innovation. 
However, the foundations for a modern and stable financial system were incomplete without a modern 
regulatory regime. The large losses experienced by several banks in the late 1980s and beginning of 
1990s highlighted the weaknesses of risk management within financial institutions. As a consequence, 
the 1990s saw the beginning of new arrangements for prudential supervision of these institutions. 
During the first half of that decade, the RBA conducted targeted, risk-based, on-site bank reviews. 
The Wallis Inquiry in 1996 set the basis for the development of the structure for a prudentially 
regulated financial system.   
                                                          
1
 Controls over interest rates on certificates of deposits and other bank deposits were removed in 1973 and 1980, 
respectively. 
2
 Before 1985 only two foreign institutions operated as authorised banks in Australia in the post-war period. 
Overseas banks assumed subsidiary status (rather than a branch structure) which requires capital to be held 
locally. For more details see RBA (2007). 
3 
 
The last major reform was the formal adoption of an inflation-targeting regime. After a period of 
unsatisfactory discretionary monetary policy, the RBA, by agreement with the Federal Treasurer, 
announced in 1996 it would target a 2%-3% inflation band. For more discussion on deregulation in 
these early stages, and in particular a detailed timeline of the reforms, see de Brouwer (1999). By 
1998, with the implementation of inflation targeting and the establishment of a regulatory oversight of 
risk-taking by banks and other financial institutions, the main features of Australia’s modern financial 
markets were in place. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the Australian mortgage 
market during the twenty years prior to the global financial crisis; with particular focus on the demand 
for housing credit. Section 3 discusses the impact of the global financial crisis on the mortgage market. 
It concentrates firstly on relevant policy responses to the global turmoil, and then analyses the demand 
for, and supply of, mortgages during the crisis period. A fourth section provides an overview of 
mortgage products currently offered in Australia. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Australian mortgage market: 20 years before the global financial crisis 
 
By 1988, some of the modern features of Australia’s financial system were in place but the framework 
for prudential regulation was still underdeveloped. Deregulation increased the number of financing 
institutions and was accompanied by new financial products. Greater competition and easier access to 
funds facilitated rapid growth in the balance sheets of institutions, which resulted in a rapid expansion 
of credit, particularly for commercial property investment. Commercial property prices were 
simultaneously increasing quickly. However, prudential standards did not keep pace with these 
market developments and, in 1989 high interest rates and a deceleration of commercial property prices, 
exposed risky loans. The economy fell into recession between 1990 and 1992. Several financial 
institutions experienced large losses; see Gizycki and Lowe (2000).
3
  
                                                          
3
 Total individual losses in the banking system represented 36% of the aggregate level of shareholders’ funds. In 
particular, state government owned banks individual losses represented 187% of shareholders’ funds. Some 
major banks, such as Westpac and ANZ also experienced significant losses.    
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This experience uncovered the need for regulatory reform and motivated the Financial System 
(`Wallis’) Inquiry in June 1996.4  The Wallis Inquiry set the basis for a tightening of regulatory 
oversight of risk-taking financial institutions; in this way, all banks were set to manage risk on a 
consolidated basis. 
Since 1998, Australian financial institutions have been regulated by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA),
5
 which assumed prudential regulation functions previously undertaken 
by the Reserve Bank (RBA). While APRA focuses on the stability of authorised deposit-taking 
institutions (ADIs),
 6
 since 2001 the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) has 
been responsible for the regulation of financial products. The RBA retains responsibility for monetary 
policy and systemic stability in the whole financial system.
7
 Senior representatives of the RBA, 
APRA, ASIC and the Department of the Treasury comprise the Council of Financial Regulators, 
which is the coordinating body for Australia's main financial regulatory agencies.  
After the financial instability of the early 1990s, banks shifted their focus towards lower risk-weighted 
assets such as housing loans. Prior to 1980, on average 60% of owner occupier housing finance 
commitments were held by banks; this share rose through the 1980s and 1990s. By 1994, the domestic 
banking system provided 92% of the residential housing credit; see figure 1. 
  
                                                          
4
 See Harper (1997). 
5
 APRA regulates banks, general and life insurance companies, superannuation funds, credit unions, building 
societies and friendly societies to ensure that these institutions remain financially sound and able to meet their 
obligations to depositors, fund members and policy holders. www.apra.gov.au  
6
 Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) are institutions that are licensed and regulated by APRA under 
the Banking Act 1959. APRA has focused on the balance sheet soundness of these financial institutions through 
specific balance sheet requirements such as capital adequacy rules and general supervisory oversight following 
Basel Committee recommendations. 
7
 A Payments System Board was established within the RBA with the responsibility to promote safety, 
competition and efficiency within the payments system. Other important players in Australian financial 
regulation are: Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB), Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 
Financial Reporting Panel (FRP), Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia (ITSA), and the Australian 
Department of Treasury. 
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Figure 1: Housing Finance Commitments 
(% of Total Housing Finance Commitments for owner-occupiers) 
 
During the second half of the 1990s, competition increased with the introduction of new players in the 
market. International lenders, who entered the market between 1985 and 1993, and wholesale 
mortgage originators and mortgage brokers, who joined around 1996, stimulated competition further. 
Financial deregulation and the entry of new lenders gave rise to a wider range of financial products 
offered. Traditionally, mortgages were a fully documented, full recourse, variable rate loan, while 
fixed rate mortgages represented less than a quarter of the mortgage market. Non-bank lenders 
introduced low-documentation loans, along with riskier loans such as interest-only loans and 
revolving credit lines. Home equity loans
8
 were introduced to the market around 1996, but grew in 
popularity from 2003.   
Lending standards relaxed over the period. Lending standards before the deregulation were quite 
conservative with a maximum debt service-to-income ratio of 30%,
9
 and loan-to-value ratios (LVR) 
of a maximum of 80%. As a result of deregulation and increased competition, measures of disposable 
income and property valuation methods were redefined and relaxed. Higher LVRs were available, 
backed by loan mortgage insurance (LMI). High LVR loans attracted a 100% risk weight under 
APRA’s capital adequacy rules. ADIs could obtain a concessional risk weight of 50% on high LVR 
                                                          
8
 Described in Section 4. 
9
 This was a `rule of thumb’ of lenders, and not a regulation. 
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loans (over 80%) with approved private LMI. The increase in the number of loan arrears in the first 
part of the 21
st
 century could be attributed to the relaxation of lending standards; nevertheless, loan 
arrears are very low relative to international standards. 
The overall effect of deregulation for the financial system was an increase in the supply of credit and 
a reduction in the cost of credit. The next subsection focuses on the players in the housing credit 
market before the global financial crisis, by first discussing the providers of housing credit and then 
giving an overview of the demand for housing loans.    
2.1 Mortgage Lenders 
 
The housing credit market has always played an important role in Australia’s financial system. 
Historically, mortgage originators, principally ADIs, held around half of the total assets in the 
financial system.  
ADIs comprise domestic and foreign banks, building societies and credit unions; although banks hold 
around 96% of the total ADI assets. The top panel of table 1 provides a snapshot of the evolution of 
the number of ADIs in the Australian mortgage market. Traditionally, the Australian banking system 
has been concentrated around four major domestic banks.
10
 During the fifteen years leading up to 
2007, the major Australian banks held over 60% of ADI assets. The lower panel of table 1 shows the 
share of total ADI assets by type of institution. After 1990, the demutualisation of building societies 
together with mergers amongst both small and major deposit-taking institutions of all types, 
transformed the composition of ADIs in the credit market. In general, foreign banks operating in 
Australia have shown relatively little interest in retail banking, focusing mainly on wholesale funding 
and funds management.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 The four major banks are, in alphabetical order: Australian and New Zealand Bank (ANZ), Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia (CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB), and Westpac Bank Corporation (WBC). 
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Table 1: Authorised Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) 
Number 1990 1999 2005 2010 
Major Australian Banks 4 4 4 4 
Other domestic banks 13 8 9 7 
Building Societies and Credit Unions 330 238 170 116 
Foreign owned Banks     
- subsidiaries  15 11 11 9 
- branches 3 25 28 34 
Total 365 286 222 170 
     
Per cent of total assets 1990 1999 2005 2010 
Major Australian Banks 59% 63% 65% 75% 
Other domestic banks 21% 17% 14% 9% 
Building Societies and Credit Unions 9% 5% 4% 3% 
Foreign owned Banks     
- subsidiaries  10% 6% 7% 4% 
- branches 1% 10% 10% 9% 
Sources: Gizycki and Lowe (2000); Donovan and Gorajek (2011). 
 
Prior to 1980, whilst 60% of owner occupier housing finance commitments were held by banks, 
building societies held a further 25% (see Figure 1), and were offering larger average loan sizes 
relative to banks.
11
 During the 1980s, with the introduction of foreign banks in the market, banks 
became even more dominant. By 1996, mortgage managers took over part of the market share 
previously held by building societies and credit unions. Figure 1 shows the change in the composition 
in the non-banking sector share of housing finance commitments; prior to 1996, building societies 
provided the majority of loans originated in this sector, but were overtaken by wholesale lenders 
thereafter. Many building societies and credit unions became banks or merged with banks, thus, by 
mid-1990s, the domestic banking system provided 92% of the residential housing credit. Wholesale 
lenders also captured some bank-originated loans by offering, on average, larger mortgages than 
banks. 
By the early 21
st
 century, while major banks approved around 60% of owner occupier home loans, 
smaller banks held around 20% of residential home loan approvals, credit unions and building 
                                                          
11
 See ABS Housing Finance Commitments 5609.013c 
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societies had less than 10% market share, and wholesale mortgage originators a little bit over 10%, 
see Davies (2009). 
Mortgage managers have been in the market since the 1960s, holding only around 1% of total loan 
approvals. Around 1995 their participation in the market grew to holding 8% of new housing loans; 
see Edey and Gray (1996). A likely reason for the increasing share of the mortgage market 
appropriated by wholesale mortgage originators and mortgage brokers post-1996 – in particular, their 
rising share of refinanced mortgages -- was the, on average, larger loans accompanied by lower 
lending rates that they offered; see figure 2. They also introduced low-documentation loans, interest 
only loans and revolving credit lines.  
Figure 2: Standard Variable Interest Rates 
 
The participation of wholesale mortgage originators in the market was enhanced with technological 
advances, but in particular, with the growth of the residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) 
market – which provided a relatively cheap funding source. The first MBS programs in Australia were 
developed around the mid-1980s by state governments to finance loans to low income households. 
The RMBS
12
 market developed further with the growth of wholesale mortgage managers. The 
Australian securitisation market expanded rapidly between the mid-1990s and the recent financial 
                                                          
12
 Australian RMBS are prime loans covered by mortgage insurance and excess spreads; see RBA (2006), `The 
Performances of Australian Residential Mortgage-backed Securities', Reserve Bank of Australia Financial 
Stability Review, March, 63-68. 
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crisis, reaching up to 7% of the total assets in the financial system by mid-2007. During this period, 
23% of outstanding housing loans had been securitised; see Davies (2009: graph 11). Securitising 
some part of on-balance sheet residential mortgage loans also helped ADIs to manage credit risk, 
release capital and manage shareholder return to investment. However, the share of securitisation in 
the funding composition of ADIs was always below 8%. The secondary market played an important 
role in mortgage funding for wholesale mortgage originators and, to a lesser degree for small ADIs. 
The major banks sourced most of their funding from deposits (see table 2), but the expansion of 
households’ demand for credit and the reduction in the growth of deposits forced financial institutions 
to increasingly rely on wholesale markets for funding, mainly by issuing debt securities to non-
residents. The share of the banking system’s total liabilities owned by non-residents rose from below 
10% in 1990 to over 25% in 2007; see figure 3. 
 Figure 3: Banks’ Liabilities  
(% of Total Liabilities) 
 
 
The first panel in table 2 presents total deposits as a share of total assets for the four major banks and 
for some smaller domestic banks. Major banks funded above 40% of their assets with resident 
deposits, smaller banks relied more on deposits as a source of funding. The second panel displays the 
proportion of households deposits held by banks. One third of major banks’ deposits were household 
10 
 
deposits -- except for Commonwealth Bank. The last panel shows the proportion of securitised assets 
held by banks. Securitised assets represent a marginal share of the major banks’ resident assets. 
Table 2: Assets and Liabilities of ADIs 
Deposit-to-Resident Assets ratio 2002 2005 2007 2009 2012 
ANZ 49.5% 49.6% 49.1% 54.2% 60. 5% 
Commonwealth Bank 64.1% 55.4% 52.9% 56.9% 58.8% 
National Australia Bank 43.0% 45.2% 41. 6% 49. 5% 53.7% 
Westpac 53.6% 54.7% 55.7% 52.7% 52.6% 
Adelaide Bank 87.2% 81.5% 75.6% 
(c)
 
(c)
 
Bank of Queensland 80.6% 74.4% 78.0% 79.7% 80.2% 
Bendigo Bank 78.5% 78.1% 78.2% 77.3% 85.7% 
Macquarie Bank 37.8% 31.3% 30.1% 35.4% 67.7% 
St George 69.6% 63.8% 64.2% 53.3% 
(d)
 
Suncorp 56.7% 60.4% 55.8% 41.4% 63.7% 
      
Per cent of deposits from households 2002 2005 2007 2009 2012 
ANZ 34.4% 29.2% 27.2% 31.9% 33.2% 
Commonwealth Bank 53.4% 57.0% 52.7% 45.3% 43.5% 
National Australia Bank 33.6% 32.0% 33.0% 29.6% 30.6% 
Westpac 36.2% 33.3% 31.1% 29.4% 39.5% 
Adelaide Bank 43.0% 31.8% 28.2% 
(c)
 
(c)
 
Bank of Queensland 39.0% 48.5% 54.4% 61.4% 55.0% 
Bendigo Bank 63.5% 58.3% 56.8% 54.0% 47.6% 
Macquarie Bank 4.8% 6.0% 2.8% 13.2% 20.8% 
St George 55.6% 55.2% 49.7% 57.3% 
(d)
 
Suncorp 39.9% 41.1% 36.0% 43.6% 41.9% 
      
Securitised Assets-to-Resident Assets 2002
(a)
 2005
(a)
 2007
(b)
 2009
(b) 
2012
(b)
 
ANZ 1.7% 1.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 
Commonwealth Bank 4.0% 5.3% 7.2% 1.7% 0.7% 
National Australia Bank 0.6% 0.9% 1.9% 0.5% 0.1% 
Westpac 2.8% 1.4% 2.8% 0.9% 1.1% 
Adelaide Bank 41.9% 49.2% 47.7% 
(c)
 
(c)
 
Bank of Queensland 18.9% 21.6% 25.4% 18.2% 7.6% 
Bendigo Bank 12.4% 3.7% 2.4% 15.6% 13.6% 
Macquarie Bank 37.2% 57. 0% 46.8% 27.3% 14.1% 
St George 10.0% 15.6% 21.0% 9.2% 
(d)
 
Suncorp 1.9% 9.7% 14.6% 6.5% 4.3% 
Source: APRA. 
(a)
 Outstanding value of all assets that have been securitised as a per cent of total resident assets. 
(b)
 Outstanding principal balance of securitised assets as a per cent of total resident assets. 
(c) 
In November 2007 Adelaide Bank merged with Bendigo Bank forming Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. 
(d) 
In November 2008 St. George Bank and its branch Bank of South Australia, became part of Westpac Group. 
In 2011 Westpac announced the relaunch of its subsidiary Bank of Melbourne, which will replace St. George 
Bank in Victoria. 
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During the first half of the new century, the banks sourced 45% of their funding from domestic 
deposits, 30% from short-term wholesale debt and 15% from long-term wholesale debt; see Deans 
and Stewart (2012: graph 1). Regional banks, small credit unions and building societies relied mainly 
on deposits, but had been active in sourcing their funding from the securitisation market. 
Increased competition in the housing mortgage market can be evidenced by a narrowing in the spread 
between the standard variable housing loan interest rate and the RBA cash rate, and also in decreasing 
banks profit margins and the proliferation of new mortgage products. As shown in Figure 4, the 
spread between the standard variable home loan interest rate and the cash rate fell from over 400 basis 
points in 1993-1994, to 180 basis points between 1997 and 2008. Net interest margins
13
 have been 
falling between 1996 and 2007, from above 4% to just above 2% for major banks, and from 3% to 
under 2% for smaller banks; see Deans and Stewart (2012: graph 11).    
Figure 4: Standard Variable Interest Rates  
(Spread to RBA Cash Rate) 
 
                                                          
13
 Net interest margins is the difference between the interest income generated by a financial institution and the 
amount of interest paid out to their lenders, relative to the interest-earning assets. 
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2.2 Australian demand for housing credit   
Home ownership in Australia has been around 70% for more than two decades.
14
 Housing debt 
accounts for three quarters of the personal sector borrowing,
15
 and at any one time, approximately one 
third of the housing stock is financed by a mortgage. 
Australia has experienced a period of exceptional expansion over the past twenty years. There have 
been no recessions since 1990-1992, inflation has remained low and stable along with nominal 
interest rates, and unemployment fell from 11% in 1993 to 4.3% in 2006.
16
 Over the same period, 
household financial assets relative to disposable income doubled from 170% to 350%; see left panel 
of figure 5. In the two decades prior to 2007, the household debt-to-income ratio increased from 
below 50% to around 150% and has since stabilized: see right panel of figure 5. Most of the 
household debt accumulation was housing debt. Property debt accounted for 84% of all household 
debt in mid-2000s. During the same period, 60% of total household assets were held in residential 
property; see Kohler and Rossiter (2005). 
 
Figure 5: Credit in Australia  
 
 
                                                          
14
 See ABS Housing Occupancy and Costs, 2007-2008, 4130.0. Half of homeowners hold a mortgage while the 
other half are out-right homeowners, 25% of Australians are renters, and 5% live in public housing 
arrangements.   
15
 See Edey and Gray (1996). 
16
 See ABS Labour Force, Australia, Jul 2013, 6202.0. 
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Between 1980 and 1990, real net national disposable income grew by 3.1% per annum on average, 
while, between 2002 and 2011 it grew by 4.1% per annum on average. 
17
 Households that experienced 
higher income were prepared to increase their spending on housing. From this perspective, household 
income growth can explain part of the rise in debt and assets held on households’ balance sheets. 
However, Fox and Finlay (2012: graph 1) report that during this period the dwelling price-to-income 
ratio had doubled, suggesting that the growth in income was not explaining all the increase in 
households balance sheet accumulation. 
Households increasingly invested in housing wealth, with little evidence of other household savings, 
with the net savings rate as low as minus 2% as a proportion of disposable income during this 
period.
18
 Households’ savings have been more oriented towards managed funds than to bank deposits, 
as a consequence of compulsory superannuation and tax incentives for voluntary contributions.
19
  
The rise in household asset (and debt) accumulation was likely due to increased leverage and 
increasing valuations of assets such as housing and equities. Between 1980 and 1995, average annual 
real house price growth was 1.1%, but between 1995 and 2005 this average annual growth rate was 
6%; see Yates (2011).
20
 As in other countries, housing prices have risen faster than consumer prices; 
see figure 6. Australia's nominal house prices rose by 63% between 2003 and 2009. Bank lending for 
housing finance increased by 14.2% per annum during the same period. Ellis (2006) argues that as a 
result of disinflation, deregulation and financial innovation the housing credit growth resulted in an 
increase in housing demand which in turn increased housing prices in the face of a highly inelastic 
supply. Caldera and Johånsson (2013) show that the long-run price-elasticity of new housing supply 
in Australia is around 0.52. The rise in house prices was channelled through an increase in 
construction costs, increase in the price of existing dwellings, and mainly an increase in the price of 
                                                          
17
 See ABS, National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product Mar 2013, 5206.0. Real net national 
disposable income per capita increased from $28000 in 1992 to $45000 in 2009. 
18
 See RBA (2011). The net saving rate is measured as the residual by subtracting consumption and depreciation 
from household disposable income. This is complicated by the existence of compulsory superannuation savings 
in Australia, which may have a crowding out effect in survey data. A savings rate calculated as the annual 
change in the household net financial wealth as a proportion of household disposable income is more volatile 
and does not exhibit a downward trend. 
19
 See Connolly and Kohler (2004).  
20
 Nominal house prices were growing on average at an 8% rate per annum between 1993 and 2005 according to 
Hansen (2006). 
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land; it also reflects a higher average quality of dwellings. Supply side rigidity of housing is discussed 
in depth by Hsieh et al (2012) and Kulish et al (2012). At the same time, higher housing prices 
generated borrowers’ need for greater housing credit in an environment of rising housing equity and 
low interest rates. The RBA had begun to notice this vicious cycle and decided to start increasing 
interest rates as early as 2002, as an attempt to cool the housing market down and deflate a potential 
housing bubble.
21
  
Figure 6: House Price Indexes (Index, 2003-04 = 100) 
and Growth in Dwelling Index 
 
Households' greater willingness to take on debt can then be explained by rising house prices 
simultaneously accompanied by the expansion of housing credit and the low and stable nominal 
interest rates environment – which reduced the initial real repayments for standard mortgage loans 
and increased borrowing capacity, see Ellis (2006).  
In addition, the Australian tax system provides incentives to households to make leveraged 
investments when asset prices are expected to increase, making owner-occupied housing and, in 
particular residential investment attractive. It gives property investors incentives to participate in the 
housing market through `negative gearing’ of related expenses against other income.22 Since 1999, the 
capital gains tax for investors apply to nominal gains at 50% of their marginal tax rate for housing 
assets held for at least a year. Investors can deduct the interest on mortgage payments and other non-
                                                          
21
 On the 8
th
 May 2002, the RBA announced an increase in its cash rate on the basis of overheating of the 
housing market amongst other concerns; see RBA media release `Statement by the Governor, Mr Ian 
Macfarlane: Monetary Policy’. http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2002/mr-02-10.html. Accessed 16 August 
2013.  
22
 Residential investors and landlords returns are not restricted by rent control, as is the case in many European 
countries. 
15 
 
cash depreciation expenses from their taxable income. Owner-occupiers have no mortgage interest 
deductibility, but do not have to pay capital gains tax and imputed rent is non-taxable. State stamp 
duty tax was levied both on the value of a purchased dwelling and on the mortgage contract for most 
of the period.
23
 However, many state and territory governments have provided stamp duty concessions 
to first home buyers, to facilitate their introduction to homeownership. 
Other policy efforts have been implemented to promote homeownership. The First Home Owner 
Grant (FHOG) was introduced by the Australian Government in July 2000, initially to offset the 
introduction of the goods and services tax. Under this scheme, first home buyers could access an 
$A7000 cash grant when buying or building a dwelling. This Federal grant was then supplemented by 
state and territory government additional grants, and in some cases stamp duty concessions; for a 
review of first-home buyer government assistance in Australia, see Dungey, Wells and Thompson 
(2011). The FOHG cash grant amount has varied over the years, giving preference to new buildings 
over existing ones, particularly in less urbanized areas, see figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: First-time buyers in Australia. 
 
 
The proportion of dwellings financed for first time buyers was around 22% until the end of 2002, as 
shown in figure 7. Many have argued that the grant scheme was effective only in bringing forward 
housing purchases that would have been made in the absence of the scheme. Wood, Watson and 
Flatau (2003) suggest that the major contribution of the FHOG was that it relaxed borrowing 
                                                          
23
 Mortgage duties were later abolished in most states, see Dungey et al (2011) page 475. 
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constraints and reduced the deposit gap. This is because mortgage lenders relaxed their savings 
requirements, allowing part of the deposit to be the FHOG.
24
  
Aggregate household debt to gross assets rose from around 12% in 1995 to reach 25% in 2008. The 
debt-service to income ratio rose from 7% to 13% between 1995 and 2007, although interest rates had 
been falling; see figure 8.  
Figure 8: Australian housing debt 
 
 
Existing home owners could afford the mortgages and constituted the main actors in the lending boom 
in Australia. These borrowers purchased higher valued properties with larger loans or became 
residential investors following the incentives given by the rise in house prices and the tax system. 
Most of them were aged in their 40s and had low levels of debt and a strong capacity to service new 
debt, see Yates (2010). In fact, the RBA reports that the arrears rate in Australia for bank's non-
performing housing loans has remained under 0.5% since the mid-1990s.
25
 In mid-2007, only 0.38% 
of bank’s housing loans were not performing and in December 2007 the 90-day arrears rate on 
securitised housing loans represented around 0.47% of outstanding loans as well; see Davies (2009).
26
  
                                                          
24
 LMI credit parameters normally required the borrower to have at least 3%-5% genuine equity to contribute 
towards the purchase, as evidence of genuine saving capabilities. In 2000, LMI agreed to recognise the FHOG 
as genuine equity for the purposes of their credit parameters. 
25
 Box B: Measurement of Housing Arrears, Reserve Bank of Australia Financial Stability Review, September 
2009. 
26
 In Australia, housing loans are defined as non-performing if they are either `past due’ (repayments are at least 
90 days past due, but the loan is well covered by collateral) or `impaired’ (at least 90 days past due or not in 
arrears but otherwise doubtful, and the loan is not well covered by collateral). 
17 
 
Rising dwelling prices and the negative gearing incentives provided by the tax system led to growth in 
bank lending to investors at an annual rate of 21% in the 1990s, compared with 13.5% for lending to 
owner occupiers, see RBA (2002). Around the mid-1990s, the spread between the interest rates 
charged on investor loans and owner occupier loans practically disappeared. A sizable share of 
financing products taken by investors has been interest only loans. Table 3 shows housing loans made 
to owner occupiers and to investors as a proportion of total ADI loans to households during the last 
decade. Major banks oriented around 40% of their loans to households on residential housing, and 20% 
on investment housing. Smaller banks focused more on residential housing lending.   
Table 3: ADIs Total Loans to Households 
Housing loans to Owner-occupier 2002 2005 2007 2009 2012 
ANZ 38.7% 39.9% 40.8% 40.1% 43.1% 
Commonwealth Bank 43.7% 44.4% 42.1% 47.1% 47.2% 
National Australia Bank 31.9% 35.8% 34.2% 34.7% 39.0% 
Westpac 46.8% 41.2% 38.3% 35.1% 41.5% 
Adelaide Bank 54.7% 50.2% 47.2% 
(c)
 
(c)
 
Bank of Queensland 55.7% 45.5% 41.5% 42.3% 43.5% 
Bendigo Bank 42.6% 40.2% 37.9% 43.2% 41.8% 
Macquarie Bank 4.1% 3.5% 5.6% 8.6% 19.9% 
St George 51.4% 49.5% 51.1% 51.3% 
(d)
 
Suncorp 43.1% 36.0% 30.8% 32.5% 49.9% 
      
Housing loans to Investors 2002 2005 2007 2009 2012 
ANZ 16.5% 18.0% 17.1% 15.8% 16.4% 
Commonwealth Bank 18.0% 24.6% 22.6% 21.8% 22.0% 
National Australia Bank 17.1% 21.5% 20.2% 18.6% 15.8% 
Westpac 21.2% 21.1% 19.5% 25.6% 29.7% 
Adelaide Bank 22.1% 30.9% 32.4% 
(c)
 
(c)
 
Bank of Queensland 3.2% 21.1% 27.8% 31.5% 36.0% 
Bendigo Bank 16.1% 15.4% 16.2% 22.0% 25.8% 
Macquarie Bank 3.2% 3.2% 5.2% 5.5% 13.0% 
St George 19.8% 23.5% 22.0% 29.0% 
(d)
 
Suncorp 12.3% 15.1% 15.2% 16.5% 19.5% 
Source: APRA. 
(c) 
In November 2007 Adelaide Bank merged with Bendigo Bank forming Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited. 
(d) 
In November 2008 St. George Bank and its branch Bank of South Australia, became part of Westpac Group. 
In 2011 Westpac announced the relaunch of its subsidiary Bank of Melbourne, which will replace St. George 
Bank in Victoria. 
 
Overall, during the two decades prior to the global financial crisis, Australian households and 
investors increased their housing credit demand as a consequence of deregulation (along with 
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competition between lenders, greater access to credit and new products), a stable economic 
environment (reflected by low inflation and low nominal interest rates, low unemployment, rising 
incomes and wealth accompanied by rising house price expectations), attractive taxation arrangements, 
and, arguably, national housing policies. However, there has been no sign of deterioration in credit 
quality during this period.    
3. Global Financial Crisis and Australia 
 
Australia avoided a recession following the global financial crisis (GFC), an outcome often attributed 
to a strong financial system with prudential lending standards and a stable institutional environment 
domestically, accompanied by a resource boom linked to China's demand and responsive and timely 
policy actions; see Davies (2013), IMF (2012) and Yates (2010). However, the GFC exposed the 
heavy reliance of Australian banks on capital-market funding and affected the housing credit market 
through increased liquidity risk for lenders. Banks played an important role in facilitating foreign 
investment through capital inflows, since they were heavily reliant on the overseas wholesale debt 
market. By corollary, the `credit crunch' closed funding avenues for mortgage lenders, and in turn 
they contracted the credit given to households.   
The main effects of the global recession on Australia were: (1) an increase in the cost of funding for 
lenders, (2) a deceleration in households’ debt and asset growth, as a consequence of a slow-down in 
credit growth and (3) a drop in policy interest rates. We first discuss the policy responses to the 
international financial turmoil, and then focus particularly on the supply of, and demand for, housing 
finance.  
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3.1 Policy Responses 
 
The first policy action to the crisis was taken by the RBA, who began cutting the policy rate from 
September 2008, and continued doing so for a year,
27
 see figure 9. However, between October 2009 
and October 2011, interest rates crawled up to 4.75%. In November 2011 the RBA decided to cut 
interest rates again to support demand as a reaction to uncertainty surrounding the European debt 
crisis and the slow-down in Chinese growth.
28
 The most recent drops in interest rates have been aimed 
at maintaining credit growth and house prices growth, amongst other concerns.
29
  
Figure 9: RBA’s Cash Rate 
 
 
With the intention of supporting the RMBS market and with it wholesale mortgage lenders, in 
September 2008, the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) purchased $A8 billion in 
RMBS. Half of the amount purchased was targeted to non-ADI mortgage originators. This measure 
was a reaction to the limited issuance by securitisers within Australia -- which was initially restricted 
with the contraction of liquidity in international capital markets. The program was reinforced in 
                                                          
27
 During September 2009 the cash rate was 3%, a historic minimum. More recently, in August 2013, the RBA 
cut interest rates further to 2.5%, which represents a 50-year minimum. 
28
 See RBA announcement on November 1 2011, `Statement by Glenn Stevens, Governor: Monetary Policy 
Decision ’. http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2011/mr-11-24.html. Accessed 16 August 2013.  
29
 See RBA announcement on August 6 2013, `Statement by Glenn Stevens, Governor: Monetary Policy 
Decision ’. http://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2013/mr-13-15.html. Accessed 16 August 2013. 
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October 2009 with a new purchase of $A8 billion in RMBS, and another $A4 billion in December 
2010. To further support liquidity in the market, the RBA expanded the range of securities for its 
repurchase agreements to include RMBS. 
Fiscal policy also contributed to supporting the economy with a $A10.4 billion fiscal stimulus in 
October 2008.
30
 This Economic Security Strategy was oriented first to households, through a direct 
one-off payment incentive to encourage consumption expenditure; it then targeted the construction 
industry through first home buyer grant incentives; while the last stage was focused on fostering long 
term infrastructure investment. The Government supported this strategy in February 2009 with the 
Nation Building and Jobs Plan stimulus package, worth $A42 billion, to be implemented over four 
years; see Swan and Tanner (2009).  
While monetary policy aimed at supporting the sources of funding for mortgage providers, fiscal 
policy stimulated housing consumption.  
Financial system support also played a very important role. Some basic structures were already in 
place. The financial system was regulated and controlled by the Council of Financial Regulators -- 
APRA, ASIC, RBA and Australian Treasury. APRA's capital standards for ADIs closely follow those 
set by the Basel Committee, and APRA has enforced compliance more stringently (and earlier) than 
in many other countries. For example, APRA and RBA had been assessing financial stability through 
stress tests during 2003 and 2005, as a result of emerging concern on the rise in household debt and 
the growth of house prices;
31
 see APRA (2003), Coleman et al (2005), APRA (2010).  
Lenders Mortgage Insurance (LMI) has been in place since 1965.
32
 It provides private insurance to 
lenders in the event of borrower default on a residential mortgage loan; the cost is borne by the 
borrower. Its initial objective was to facilitate the entry of first home buyers to the mortgage market. 
                                                          
30
 For more details see Commonwealth Ombudsman (2009), `Administration of the Economic Security Strategy 
Payment. An examination of the implementation, monitoring and review of the scheme', Report No. 16/2009.  
http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/files/investigation\_2009\_16.pdf. Accessed 4th August 2013. 
31
 APRA had also experienced the need for more regulatory supervision with the failure of a major insurance 
company (HIH) in March 2001.  
32
 Lenders Mortgage Insurance (LMI) is regulated by APRA under the Insurance Act 1973 and the General 
Insurance Reform Act 2001.  
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High LVR loans attract a 100% risk weight under APRA's implementation of Basel capital adequacy 
rules; but ADIs could obtain a concessional risk weight of 50% on high LVR (over 80%) loans with 
approved private LMI. ADIs and wholesale mortgage lenders also decided to acquire LMI in order to 
transfer credit risk from their loan books and as a credit enhancement tool to gain access to wholesale 
funding through the mortgage backed securitisation markets. While non-bank mortgage managers and 
originators insure all loans irrespective of the LVR,
33
 major banks insure 20% of their mortgages, see 
ICA (2003).     
The response to the financial turmoil in late 2008 was aided by the existing regulatory standards. 
APRA had implemented the Basel II framework through prudential standards and prudential practice 
guides from 1 January 2008.  The AOFM securities lending facility, established in 2004 to prevent 
failure in the secondary market trades, was heavily used when the Commonwealth Government 
Securities market became illiquid during 2008. However, a range of new policies were also developed 
as a reaction to the international crisis.      
In October 2008 the Commonwealth Government introduced the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) 
which established a guarantee of deposits of up to $A1 million per account holder per Australian ADI. 
At the same time, a fee-based Guarantee Scheme for wholesale funding (with a rolling maturity of 
five years) and large deposits
34
 (over $A1 million) was also introduced with the intention to assure 
ADIs' access to funding. These guarantee schemes not only assisted ADIs to access funding, but also 
provided confidence in the capital markets and insure that Australian financial institutions were not 
disadvantaged compared with international institutions with existing deposit guarantee schemes.
35
 The 
fee for the Guarantee Scheme was lower for higher rated institutions. By 2010, the Guarantee Scheme 
covered 7.5% of total ADI liabilities, mainly long-term wholesale funding; it covered 15% of the 
value of all wholesale liabilities and 1% of the value of total large deposits (more than A$1 million). 
The wholesale funding guarantee was removed for new liabilities from March 2010, and banks have 
                                                          
33
 Generally when LVRs are above 80% mortgage managers pass the LMI premium onto the borrower. 
34
 Formally known as Australian Government Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding. 
For an insight on the scheme see Schwartz (2010). 
35
 See Schwartz (2010), Claessens et al (2010: Table 1) and Demirgüҫ-Kunt, et al (2008) – Chapter 11 Deposit 
Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database, Chapter 11, 263.  
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been `buying back’ insured bond issues as international interest rates have fallen. FCS remains a 
guarantee for deposits up to $A250000 since February 2012.  
All of these measures helped domestic financial institutions, but as the global financial crisis 
advanced more adjustments have been made. In October 2011 the Government introduced legislation 
to allow ADIs to issue covered bonds.
36
 The intention with this legislation was to facilitate funding 
diversification by allowing ADIs to access low risk (and lower funding cost) and longer maturity debt 
securities held on issuer’s balance sheet. RBA reports that as of March 2013 banks have issued $A50 
billion in covered bonds since their introduction, with AAA credit rating.  
With the intention of easing the potential customer transition between lenders, on July 2011 the 
Federal Government banned exit fees on variable home loans; see Rudd and Stewart (2011).  
Currently, Australia has a well-capitalized, although concentrated, banking system. APRA intends to 
implement Basel III standards for capital ahead of schedule. The RBA will create a committed 
liquidity facility in 2015 under which ADIs will be able to access liquidity using repurchase 
agreements outside normal market operations in exchange for a fee. This initiative will help ADIs 
meet the Basel III proposed liquidity coverage ratio.  
3.2 Market reaction – supply of housing credit 
 
The impact of the crisis for Australian ADIs resulted in increases in wholesale funding costs, 
particularly for longer maturities, and reduced access to longer-term funding sources; see Deans and 
Stewart (2012).
37
  The left panel of figure 10 portrays the spread between the bank bill yield and the 
overnight index swap (OIS) yield, showing high peaks commencing in late 2007, reflecting high 
credit and liquidity risks.  
  
                                                          
36
 The legislation is the Banking Amendment (Covered Bonds) Act 2011. Under the legislation ADIs must limit 
the value of its cover pools to a maximum of 8% of its assets. 
37
 For more information on the recent developments in the domestic market for short-term debt securities see 
Boge and Wilson (2011). 
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Figure10: Money Market Rates 
 
 
Major banks increased their use of deposits and reduced their use of short-term debt, even though they 
could still access expensive short- and long-term debt given their strong credit ratings. The regional 
banks cut the use of securitization and increased their use of deposits, as shown previously in table 2. 
Foreign banks have also reduced their use of long-term wholesale debt and domestic deposits. Credit 
unions and building societies continue to raise the vast majority of their funds via deposits, with no 
support from an inactive securitisation market; see Brown, Davies, Fabbro and Hanrick (2010: table 
1). Banks have been also trying to increase their common equity in recent years by retaining earnings 
and by share placements. Major banks have also raised funding from covered bonds since October 
2011.  
The securitisation market was strongly affected by the global financial crisis. The developments in the 
credit default swap (CDS) market are a good indication of this impact, as the perceived risk of banks 
around the world peaked, see figure 11. The previously rapid growth in domestic securitisation (of 
primarily residential mortgages) slowed dramatically, while international issues largely ceased despite 
the low risk nature of Australian securitised products. Between July 2007 and early 2009, the 
securitisation market in Australia was disrupted. Non-ADI mortgage originators relied heavily on this 
source of funding, while small regional banks, credit unions and building societies had been 
increasing their sourcing from the secondary market. As previously mentioned, major banks used 
securitisation only marginally. Consequently, wholesale mortgage originators, smaller banks, building 
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societies and credit unions became less competitive, finding it harder to raise funding and offer 
competitive interest rates. To maintain some level of securitisation activity, particularly for smaller 
ADIs and non-ADI mortgage lenders, the Treasurer directed the AOFM to invest up to $A20 billion 
to support securitisation markets, as discussed in the sub-section 3.1. Since 2009 the securitisation 
market has recovered but remains below pre-crisis intensity.  
Figure 11: 5 year Spread AA CDS 
 
 
The increasing share of funding sourced from deposits and the shift away from short-term wholesale 
funding towards long-term wholesale funding -- facilitated by government guarantees -- suggest both 
that the alternative sources for funding were restricted or hard to access, and that major banks have 
sought to reduce their rollover risk -- the risk associated with replacing maturing wholesale debt. 
These trends are consistent with the objectives of the Basel III global liquidity standards. If banks are 
taking more long-term debt, rather than short-term debt, they are expecting interest rates to increase -- 
taking a fixed rate position and offering a variable rate to consumers to gain by speculating with a rise 
in interest rates. This hypothesis is supported by the drop in the numbers and proportion of fixed-rate 
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mortgages transacted.
38
 Figure 12 shows that the proportion of fixed rate mortgages committed 
reached a minimum between 2007 and 2009. 
Figure 12: Fixed Rate Mortgages 
(% of all dwellings with housing finance commitments) 
 
 
Major banks have focused on domestic deposit funding, mainly through term deposits.
39
 Domestic 
deposits increased from around 43% of liabilities to around 53%. The increased usage of deposit 
funding is likely to be reinforced by Basel III liquidity requirements which, in general, give greater 
weight to retail deposits as stable sources of funds and also induce use of longer term funding 
instruments. This competition for domestic term deposits has pushed term deposit rates up, as shown 
in figure 13. 
  
                                                          
38
 In Australia, fixed-rate mortgages are defined as loans with a set interest rate that cannot be varied for a 
minimum period of two years. 
39
 Since 2012, Robertson and Rush (2013) argue that the growth in deposit has been in at-call savings. 
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Figure 13: Bank Term Deposit Rates  
($A10000) 
 
 
Major banks’ competition for domestic deposit funding has significant implications for smaller 
institutions that primarily rely on this source of funding. This competition effect, supported by the 
implicit government guarantee which allows major banks to enjoy a funding cost advantage, has 
contributed in a higher concentration of the mortgage market around the major banks;
40
 this argument 
is supported by the lower panel of table 1. While in 2011 major banks accounted for approximately 75% 
of ADI assets, and approved around 80% of residential home loans, Donovan and Gorajek (2011), in 
2012 the four major banks held 80% of banking assets and 88% of residential mortgages, see IMF 
(2012).  
As shown in Figure 4, the increased cost of wholesale debt funding together with the higher term 
deposit rates in the domestic market as a result of increased competition, have been reflected in higher 
loan interest rates. Prior to 2007, banks’ costs of funds followed the cash rate and generally banks 
adjusted variable rate mortgage interest rates when the cash rate was reviewed. With the global 
financial crisis this relationship weakened and the spread between the standard variable rate and the 
cash rate widened as costs of funds increased for lending institutions. Further potential contributor to 
                                                          
40
 IMF (2012) argues that major banks are systemically risky given their size, interconnectedness and 
complexity.  
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higher mortgage interest rates could be an increase in default risk. However, major banks reported that 
the expected loss rate for residential mortgage lending rose by only about 5 basis points from March 
2008 to a peak in March 2010, Fabbro and Hack (2011). 
Funding costs rose more than the RBA target rate. The cumulative change in the cost of funding for 
banks spreads to the cash rate in 2012 was estimated to be about 120-130 basis points higher than 
mid-2007, see Deans and Stewart (2012: graph 8).
 41
 Most of the increase occurred during 2008 and 
early 2009 when the financial crisis was at its most intense. Since mid-2011 bank's funding costs fell, 
but by less than the reduction in the cash rate. There were particularly pronounced increases in the 
cost of term deposits and long-term wholesale debt relative to the cash rate, which reflects 
competition, mainly for term deposits, and sentient concerns about the global banking industry. 
Major banks have been experiencing a small increase in their net interest margin, which reached pre-
crisis heights by the end of 2009, see Brown et al (2010). On the other hand, regional banks have been 
facing declining net interest margins, see Robertson and Rush (2013: graph 14).  
3.3 Market reaction – demand for housing credit 
 
Growth in both household assets and household debt decelerated with the international financial 
tightening. The fall in equity values particularly affected retired, or near retired, households through 
their retirement savings. The increasing trend in the proportion of assets to disposable income was 
curtailed by the global financial developments, as shown in the left panel of Figures 5. Household 
debt-to-disposable income growth also stopped as evidenced in the right panel of Figure 5. Credit 
conditions tightened, although households may have also become more risk averse after the global 
financial crisis. The sharp increase in the debt-to-asset ratio in 2008 could be attributed to the decline 
in the value of housing assets, see left panel of Figure 8 and Figure 6. The price of existing houses 
dropped between 2008 and 2009, and it then increased to remain 50% higher than in 2003-2004.      
                                                          
41
 The costs of individual funding sources are weighted by their share of total bank funding. 
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However, household deposits in the ADI sector have been growing since 2007, as shown for example 
in the middle panel of Table 2.
42
 Households direct deposit holdings have increased mainly because of 
asset price declines and poor returns on investments during the financial crisis, but also because of 
strong competition between banks for household deposits to replace international wholesale 
borrowings, and the deposit guarantee provided by the Government. The household net saving ratio as 
a per cent of household disposable income has been rising since 2004 from around -2% to 10% in 
2011, see RBA (2011: graph C1).      
On the other hand, the drop in nominal interest rates has facilitated debt servicing for existing 
mortgages, see right panel of Figure 8. However, Yates (2012) argues that asymmetries in borrowers' 
responses to increases and decreases in interest rates could exist, as borrowers maintained their 
scheduled repayments even when interest rates have dropped, to reduce their debt faster. This 
suggests a passive reaction to drops in interest rates and therefore, a maintenance of repayment 
schedules which implies a faster payment of principal outstanding. Australian households tend to have 
prepayment buffers and be ahead of their scheduled repayments.
43
 RBA (2012) reports that 22% of 
indebted household made substantial principal early repayments on their mortgages in 2010, 
compared to an average of 15% between 2002 and 2007.    
The FHOG scheme was boosted by the fiscal stimulus policy in 2008 in order to stimulate 
construction of new dwellings as previously discussed. Under the Economic Security Strategy first 
home buyers were eligible for grants up to $A21000 for the purchase of newly constructed homes. In 
2008 prices, the grant represented 5% of the median house price.
44
 Many first home owners took 
advantage of the boost; the left panel of Figure 7 shows that the proportion of first time buyers 
doubled during this period. Nevertheless, with house prices still relatively high, and expectation of 
                                                          
42
 Also see Connolly, Fleming and Jääskelä (2012). 
43
 Given the tax incentives, over half of owner-occupiers are estimated to be ahead on their mortgage 
repayments compared to less than 40% of investors. 
44
 The $A21000 grant provided to first home buyers who were building or purchasing new homes represented a 
4.5% of the median price for established houses in Sydney and 5.5% for established houses in Melbourne, while 
in rural areas such as Hobart it represented 7% of the median house prices, see ABS, House Price Indexes: Eight 
Capital Cities, Jun 2013, 6416.02.    
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higher house price growth, tighter lending standards and uncertainty in the real markets, the number 
of dwelling financed for first time buyers is currently below 15%.  
Loan arrears increased with the global financial crisis, but they remain at relatively low levels by 
international standards. Banks’ on-balance sheet non-performing loans increased from 0.3% of all 
outstanding loans in 2007 to 0.6% in 2009. Securitised loans in arrears increased from around 0.6% to 
1.1% during the same period. Non-conforming loans in arrears rose from 6.5% of all outstanding 
loans in arrears in 2007 to over 9.4% in 2009.     
The aftermath of the financial turmoil was a deceleration and stagnation of housing credit and a 
tightening of lending standards. Households shifted from being net borrowers to net lenders. Despite 
policies aimed at encouraging housing market activity, borrowers, both owner occupier and investors, 
remain cautious in the uncertain environment.    
4. Current mortgage products in Australia 
 
Through the twenty five years of financial deregulation the menu of mortgage products from which 
Australian borrowers may choose has been extended. We present an overview of mortgage products 
offered in Australia in 2013. 
Currently, the most common home loan product offered in Australia is the variable home loan, 
accounting for approximately 85% of all mortgages and 60% of all home loans for owner-occupiers. 
Ellis (2006) observes that in countries where mortgage interest payments are not deductible for 
owner-occupiers (as is the case in Australia) variable rate loans are the predominant mortgage type. 
Non-interest deductibility gives incentives to owner-occupier mortgagees to make frequent pre-
payments and fixed rate mortgages tend to have high prepayment costs. Variable rate mortgages offer 
a variable interest rate that fluctuates following the cost of funds of the mortgage originator and the 
interbank cash rate reported by the RBA. The major banks have typically added a spread of around 
180 basis points to the RBA cash rate; however, in recent years this spread has been wider, reaching 
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300 basis points, see Figure 4. For an overview of the features and costs of a standard variable rate 
mortgage see Table 4 in the Appendix. 
Other variable rate products are also available. `Honeymoon’ mortgages generally provide some 
discount from the variable rate for a fixed period of time, also called a `teaser’ rate, and have fewer 
loan features -- for example offset accounts
45
 are not offered. `Honeymoon’ loans have the lowest 
associated advertised interest rates;
46
 see Table 5.   
For these variable rate mortgage products, early or additional repayments are not generally penalized, 
and repayments can sometimes be redrawn. Because mortgage interest is not tax deductible, a redraw 
facility offers a relatively high risk-free after-tax vehicle for short-term saving for many households. 
The maximum loan amount is 80% of the valuation of the property, but it could be up to 90-95% if 
borrowers take loan mortgage insurance (LMI). These types of loans require an establishment fee and 
a monthly loan service fee, which sometimes is waived or negotiated by loan officers according to 
borrowers' characteristics. These loans do not offer the rate lock option
47
, but they may offer an 
interest only option. Interest only loans are more common for investor mortgages. Ellis (2006) 
suggests that the mortgage interest deductibility for investors in Australia allows them to consider an 
interest-only loan in the expectation that the post-tax returns exceed the interest paid on the interest 
only loan.  
Fixed rate home loans represent currently around 20% of the mortgages taken in Australia, see Figure 
12.
48
 These mortgage products offer certainty of repayment for a fixed period and then reset into a 
variable interest rate mortgage. Interest rates are generally fixed between 1-5 years, but could be fixed 
for up to 10-15 years.
49
 Interest rates increase with the length of the fixed period. Early repayment is 
                                                          
45
 Offset accounts are a savings or transaction account associated with the mortgage account. The credit balance 
of the transaction account is offset daily against the outstanding loan balance, reducing the interest payable on 
the mortgage.  
46
 Houston et al (1991) argue that the cost of a teaser adjustable-rate mortgage is typically built into the contract 
rate after the teaser has expired and lenders may also offset the teaser rate through upfront fees and points. 
47
 Rate lock option refers to the advertised interest rate at the time of application being kept fixed for a 
maximum of 90 days in exchange of a fee. 
48
 Historically, fixed-rate mortgages have represented around 12% of all mortgages in Australia. The current 
high proportion of fixed rate home loans is likely due to current low interest rates.  
49
 Most fixed rate mortgages do not exceed 5 years. 
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highly penalized, with the borrower compensating the bank for the present discounted value of its lost 
income stream. A rate lock option, offset account and additional repayments are accessible during the 
fixed term of the loan, but the latter can only be made up to a pre-set tolerance amount. A repayment 
redraw option can only be used once the fixed rate period is over, and an interest-only option may be 
available; see Table 6. 
In general, all these mortgage products can be taken for a maximum term of 30 years, but the typical 
loan term is 25 years; interest is compounded daily, and repayments can be made weekly, fortnightly 
or monthly. The aggregate average loan-to-value ratio (LVR) is 67%.
50
 Options to switch loans and 
loan portability are generally available, although not commonly exercised.  
Home equity loans,
51
 secured on a registered mortgage over the residential property, originated in the 
mid-1990s, and became relatively popular around 2006, probably as a result of the strong growth in 
house prices. A home equity loan is a line of credit secured on the equity of the existing property. 
These are very distinctive loans. Therefore, borrowers taking a home equity loan need to be existing 
mortgage holders with the institution or out-right owners of their property, and most of them would be 
re-negotiating their terms. Line of credit funds from the home equity are available for any personal 
use, and they can be accessed in diverse ways. The advertised interest rates for home equity loans are 
                                                          
50
 The median LVR is around 72%; see APRA (2008).  
51
 Besides home equity loans, there are three other types of equity release products which are not very popular in 
Australia: (1) under a shared appreciation mortgage, the borrower gives up the right to some of the capital gain 
on the property in return for paying reduced or no interest on the loan; (2) reverse mortgages are contracts where 
the borrower accesses a loan against the equity of their home, and the principal and interest need not be repaid 
until the home is sold (in the event of death of the borrower or voluntary eviction); (3) in a home reversion 
scheme, homeowners sell a part or all of their home below market value, but can remain in the property until the 
event of death or voluntary inhabitation -- a sale-lease model and sale-mortgage model are available. These 
products reappeared in the Australian housing credit market around 2004, after previous limited acceptance; see 
ASIC (2005) and Alai et al (2013). 
Reverse mortgages are the most popular of these three equity release products, and are mainly distributed by 
mortgage brokers (also see Australian Government Pension Loans Scheme). Reverse mortgages allow senior 
homeowners (over 60 years old) to access the equity of their home until they decide not to live in their homes 
anymore or in the event of death; the lender then recovers the loan either by payment of the debt or by acquiring 
the property securing the loan. Repayments are not scheduled; interest and fees accumulate until the loan is 
repaid. The maximum loan amount and the LVR increase with age -- the loan amount is capped and the 
maximum LVR is generally 45%. On 18 September 2008 the Government introduced `negative equity 
protection' on all reverse mortgage contracts, which means that the borrower can't owe more than the equity of 
their home. Establishment fees and interest rates are relatively high; this possibly is explained by the fact that 
lenders need to bear longevity risk, as well as consider adverse selection and moral hazard; see Davidoff and 
Welke (2004). 
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relatively high; and an establishment fee and annual service fee are required. The repayment 
frequency is not scheduled: it can be a once-off payment or a regular payment. Repayments can 
sometimes be redrawn, the rate lock option is not offered, but the interest only option is available; see 
Table 7.  
Banks also offer home loan packages with discounts -- subject to the size of the loan and the risk 
profile of the borrower -- and different loan features. Examples of features include: extra repayments 
without penalty, repayment redraw facility, top ups, repayment holidays, and an interest off-set 
account. Some other home loans offered include construction loans, residential land loans, 
improvement loans, split loans and residential investment property loans (RIPL). A split loan assigns 
a portion of the loan amount to a variable interest rate, and another portion to a fixed interest rate. 
Interest-only loans do not require borrowers to make repayments of principal for up to 10-15 years. 
The RBA reports that 15% of owner-occupier loans were interest-only loans in 2005, compared to 10% 
in 2003.
 52
 In 2005, the share of interest-only investor loans was around 60%, compared to around 50% 
in 2003. IMF (2012) reports that in 2012 30% of new mortgages are interest-only mortgages and 55% 
of those mortgages are interest-only investor loans. The interest-only option is also available for low-
documentation loans and non-conforming loans. 
Low-documentation loans are those where borrowers self-report their financial position, and may be 
used for example by unincorporated businesses which are using the family home as security. During 
the five years from 2000, approximately 10% of the value of the loans approved arose from low-doc 
loans based on self-certification of repayment capacity, compared with less than 0.5% in 2000. Non-
conforming loans provided by non-authorised deposit-taking institutions, where borrowers do not 
meet standard lending criteria,
53
 accounted for less than 1% of outstanding housing loans in 2007. 
Between 2000 and 2007 the proportion of non-banks' on-balance sheets loans classified as non-
conforming rose from 0.2% to 0.4%; and by 2011 this increased to 0.8%. Most non-conforming loans 
were issued in around 2005 when lending standards were relaxed. The average LVR for these loans is 
                                                          
52
 Box B: Interest-only Housing Loans, Reserve Bank of Australia Financial Stability Review, September 2006. 
53
 Borrowers typically either have poor credit histories or are seeking a loan with a LTV above 95%. The first 
specialist non-conforming mortgage provider entered the Australian market in 1997. 
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70%.
54
 The average LVR for low-documentation loans is around 54%.
55
 Most low-documentation or 
non-conforming loans in Australia are covered by collateral.    
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of the financial market in Australia in the last 25 years has been driven by technological 
changes, greater economic and monetary stability, and financial innovation. The financial sector 
experienced development and growth in its size, which resulted in considerable growth in household 
credit. In the two decades before 2007, the household’s balance sheet expanded. 
A number of factors contributed to the increase in household debt in Australia. Deregulation in the 
early 1980s resulted in an increase in the number of financing institutions and was accompanied by a 
rise in new financial products. Deregulation increased competition and innovation in the financial 
sector. The price of housing rose, consistent with the experience of other developed countries around 
the world. The expectation of growth in prices, together with the Australian tax system and its 
superannuation scheme, promote household investment and indebtedness. These factors are all 
accompanied by a transitioning to a lower inflation environment in the early 1990s-- and therefore 
lower interest rates -- which enabled larger household debt.  
This scenario changed with the preamble of the global financial turmoil in 2007. Financial uncertainty 
led to credit tightening and a deceleration in household balance sheet accumulation. Australia was 
`lucky'
56
 in avoiding a recession during the global financial crisis. Currently, the slow recovery of the 
U.S. and European economies together with a slowdown in China's growth creates concern.  
These concerns translate directly into the market for housing credit. While most borrowers in 
Australia hold variable rate mortgages -- which allows a direct flow of cash rate policy into mortgage 
interest rates – since 2008 banks have faced higher funding costs and are increasingly divorcing their 
                                                          
54
 Box C: Non-conforming Housing Loans, Reserve Bank of Australia Financial Stability Review, March, 2005, 
41-42. 
55
 The median LVR for low-documentation loans is around 56%. 
56
 See RBA Governor's, Glenn Stevens, address to The Anika Foundation Luncheon, `The Lucky Country', 24 
July 2012, Sydney -- RBA Bulletin, September quarter 2012, 75-83. 
34 
 
standard variable rates from the policy cash rate. Credit growth and house price appreciation have 
decelerated. The financial sector is more concentrated than before the financial turmoil, due in part to 
regulator responses such as deposit insurance.   
Australian regulators have been aware and rapidly responsive to international uncertainty and 
potential flaws in the financial system. The RBA and the Federal Government reacted promptly to the 
global crisis in 2008. New measures are being put in place to face external threats -- such as the 
European sovereign debt crisis and China's slowdown -- and potential internal flaws -- such as the 
banking sector potential systemic risk.  
Overall, even though major banks increased their share of financial system assets, they have changed 
the composition of their balance sheet and appear to hold a strong capital position and healthy funding. 
The household sector has shift from being net borrowers to net lenders towards the end of the decade 
with offsetting changes for the Government sector. Australia still has a sound financial system, its 
government debt is AAA rated. Residential mortgages together with superannuation funds represent 
the largest assets in the financial system.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 4: Examples of Standard Variable Rate home loan contracts offered in Australia 
Features CBA ANZ 
Bendigo 
Bank 
WBC 
Bank of 
Queensland 
Rate 7.36% 7.41% 7.45% 7.51% 7.51% 
Comparison rate 7.49% 7.52% 7.59% 7.64% 7.63% 
Establishment Fee $600 $600 $230 $600 $495 
Service Fee $8 $5 $8 $8 $10 
LVR 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
LMI 97% 95% 97% 95% 95% 
Early Repayment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Redraw Yes* Yes Yes* Yes Yes 
Interest Only Yes Yes’ No Yes’ Yes’ 
Offset Account Yes Yes No Yes Yes* 
Notes: Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), Australia and New Zealand Bank (ANZ) and Westpac Bank 
Corporation (WBC) are three of the major four banks in Australia. Bendigo Bank and the Bank of Queensland 
are smaller regional banks. 
* includes a fee. 
‘ for a limited period. 
Rate
 
refers to the current interest rate for the first fortnight October 2010. Comparison rate are interest rates 
calculated and published by each bank on the basis of secured credit of A$150000 over a 25 year term mortgage, 
based on monthly repayments. Establishment Fee is an upfront fee that could be a combination between an 
application fee and a settlement fee. Service Fee is a monthly fee. LVR refers to the maximum loan-to-value 
ratio offered by the bank. LMI refers to the LVR offered if private Loan Mortgage Insurance (LMI) is contracted. 
Early repayment refers to the possibility of early payments to reduce the outstanding principal balance and the 
term of the loan. Redraw offers the possibility to withdraw additional payments already made. The Interest Only 
feature gives the option to reduce the monthly commitments by paying only the interest amount due each month, 
and defer principal payment for later in the life of the loan. Offset Account is a feature that links an existing 
personal account with the bank to the home loan account, whereby the borrower is able to offset the funds in the 
personal account against the loan, and pay interest on the net amount. All prices are as at October 2010; at that 
time the RBA’s target cash rate was 4.50%. 
 
 
Table 5: Examples of `Honeymoon’ home loan contracts offered in Australia 
Features CBA ANZ 
Bendigo 
Bank 
WBC 
Bank of 
Queensland 
Discount period 12 months -- -- -- 12 months 
Rate 6.66% 6.71% 6.95% 6.81% 6.51% 
Comparison rate 7.41% 6.76% 7.01% 6.86% 7.52% 
Establishment Fee $600 $600 $230 $600 $495 
Service Fee $8 $0 $0 $0 $10 
LVR 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
LMI 95% 95% 97% 95% 95% 
Early Repayment Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Redraw Yes* Yes Yes* Yes* Yes 
Interest Only Yes Yes’ -- Yes’ Yes’ 
Offset Account Yes No No No Yes* 
Notes: 
* includes a fee. 
‘ for a limited period. 
For definitions refer to Table 4. All prices are as at October 2010; at that time the RBA’s target cash rate was 
4.50%. 
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Table 6: Examples Standard Fixed Rate home loan contracts offered in Australia 
Features CBA ANZ 
Bendigo 
Bank 
WBC 
Bank of 
Queensland 
Fixed period 1-15 yrs 1-10 yrs 1-5 yrs 1-10 yrs 1-5 yrs 
Rate 5-year 7.79% 7.74% 7.99% 7.89% 7.84% 
Comparison rate 7.69% 7. 56% 8. 41% -- 7.78% 
Establishment Fee $600 $600 $230 $600 $495 
Service Fee $8 $10 $8 $8 $10 
LVR 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
LMI 97% 95% 97% 95% 95% 
Early Repayment Yes” Yes” Yes” Yes” Yes” 
Redraw No No Yes* Yes* No 
Interest Only Yes Yes’ No Yes’ Yes 
Offset Account Partial Partial No No Yes*’ 
Notes: 
* includes a fee. 
‘ for a limited period. 
“ limited amount 
Fixed period refers the time in years that the interest rate is fixed for. Rate 5-year shows the fixed interest rate 
offered by the banks for a 5-year fixed rate loan. For definitions refer to Table 4. All prices are as at October 
2010; at that time the RBA’s target cash rate was 4.50%. 
 
 
Table 7: Examples of Home Equity Loan contracts offered in Australia 
Features CBA ANZ 
Bendigo 
Bank 
WBC 
Bank of 
Queensland 
Rate  7.46% 7.56% 7.55% 7.66% 7.86% 
Comparison rate -- 7. 65% -- 7.64% -- 
Establishment Fee $600 $600 $230 $600 $495 
Service Fee $12 $12.5 $8 $10 $10 
LVR 80% -- 80% 80% 80% 
LMI 92% 97% 90% 95% 90% 
Early Repayment -- No No Yes Yes 
Redraw Yes Yes No Yes* -- 
Interest Only Yes Yes’ -- Yes Yes 
Offset Account -- No -- No -- 
Notes: 
* includes a fee. 
For definitions refer to Table 4. All prices are as at October 2010; at that time the RBA’s target cash rate was 
4.50%. 
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